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RESCISSION BY THIRD PARTY PRIOR TO PRINCIPAL'S
RATIFICATION OF AGENT'S UNAUTHORIZED ACTION
Ratification' by an alleged principal of acts that another person has
assumed to do in his behalf without prior auth6rization gives rise to two
general questions. First, can the person who ratifies be held liable for or be
bound by the acts he has ratified? Second, can the person who ratifies bind
the person that his assumed agent has presumed to bargain with if this person
attempts to withdraw before the alleged principal ratifies? Each question presents conditions and refinements.
The present discussion will be confined to the second of the above questions-viz., Can the third party recede from the agreement prior to ratification
by the principal? Three or four different answers have been given to this
question. The theories sustaining these answers will now be considered in
detail.
1. In order for an act to be capable of ratification certain conditions must be satisfied.
(1) The act must be unauthorized. HUFFCUT, AGENCY § 30 (2d ed. 1901); 1 MECHEMt,
AGENCY, § 347 (2d ed. 1914) ; STORY, AGENCY § 240 (5th ed. 1857). A distinction is made
between void and voidable acts; TIFFANY, AGENCY § 45 (2d ed., Powell, 1924); Breckenridge, Ratification in North Carolina,.18 N. C. L. REv. 308, 309 (1940). (2) It must be
an act which the principal could have authorized. Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772,
18 L. Ed. 556 (U. S.1866) ; Breslin v. National Surety Co., 114 F. 2d 65 (C. C. A. 3d
1930); Henry Christian Building & Loan Ass'n v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201, 37 Atl. 261

(1897);

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

§ 84 (1933).

(3) The act must have been done in

behalf of the alleged principal. Flowe v. Hartwick, 167 N. C. 448, 83 S. E. 841 (1914),
13 Micia. L. REv. 523 (1915); Nowata Oil Syndicate v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 93
Okla. 6, 219 Pac. 339 (1923), 22 MICH. L. Rv. 474 (1924). See generally, HUFFCUT,
AGENCY § 31 (2d ed. 1901); 1 MECHE,
AGENCY § 347 (2d ed. 1914); RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 85 (1933); Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 890 (1920).
(4) It must be an act from which absurd and unjust results will not follow if ratified.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. United States, 244 U. S. 351, 37 Sup. Ct. 625,
61 L. Ed. 1184 (1917) (principal must ratify entire act); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 96
(1933); 5 TEMP. L. Q. 305 (1931) (a "principal cannot in part ratify and in part
repudiate an act of his agent"). An additional requirement is that the principal have
knowledge of the material facts. 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 316 (1916) ("Except in those cases
where the principal intentionally assumes responsibility without inquiry, a ratification is
not binding unless made with a'full and complete knowledge of all the material facts.") ;
see also, 29 W. Va. L. Q. 67 (1922). Ratification must not affect rights of intervening
third parties. United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370, 27 Sup. Ct. 742, 51 L. Ed.
1098 (1907); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 101(C) (1933).
Ratification has been erroneously considered as estoppel. "It has nothing to do with
estoppel, but the desire to reduce the lav to general principles has led some courts to cut
it down to that point." Holmes, Agency, 5 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1891). See also, 1
MECHEM, AGENCY § 349 (2d ed. 1914) (how ratification differs from estoppel); R STATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 94, 103 (1933); Stern, A Problem in the Lau, of Agency, 4
MARQ. L. REv. 6 (1919)
(discussing estoppel). As the commentator says in 8 TEx. L.
REv. 576 (1930) : "It is usually stated that there is a duty on the principal to repudiate
an unauthorized act of his agent within a reasonable time, and that a long delay in disavowing such an act will amount to a ratification of it. This statement is perhaps not
strictly correct, for rather than being under a duty to disaffirm, the principal is merely
put to his election as to whether he will ratify the act or not, and delay in expressing
himself will be evidence of an intent to do so. Ratification is based on intention and the
principal's silence is important only insofar as it shows what his intention is.".
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NO TES
ENGLISH VIEW

The English theory, as advanced by the Court of Appeals "inBolton
Partnersv. Lambert,2 is to the effect that the third party cannot recede. The
basis of this view is that the transaction is completed at the time the unauthorized agent enters into the agreement with the third party. The only
missing factor is the assent of the principal to the agreement accepted for
him by the agent. Ratification serves as the proof of the agent's authority to
act for the principal and relates back to the time of the doing of the act.3
Limited support for the English theory can be found in the United States.
In Andrews v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,4 the agent of the defendant insurer placed
in a life insurance policy an unauthorized clause which the defendant subsequently ratified after the plaintiff had attempted to rescind it. The New York
Court of Appeals stated that the "principal, upon being informed of an act of
an agent in excess of his authority, has the right to elect whether he will
adopt the unauthorized act, or not, and so long as the condition of the parties
is unchanged, he cannot be prevented from such adoption because the other
party to the contract may for any reason prefer to treat the contract as invalid, and his election, once made, is irrevocable."
It has been suggested that the view expressed in the Bolton case has been
modified to the extent that ratification must come within a reasonable time.
"Since the standard of reasonableness is a question of fact, [this modification]
...provides a useful escape from the rigours of the rule in Bolton v. Lambert
as originally known." 5
An additional method has been suggested to lessen the "unfairness" of the
English theory. In Walter v. James it was held that where an unauthorized
transaction was entered into by an agent and a third party that these two
2. 41 Ch. D. 295 (C. A. 1897). The case of In re Portuguese Consolidated Copper
Mines Ltd., 45 Ch. D. 16 (1890), has been frequently cited as supporting the decision of
the Bolton case. However, the court in the Portuguese Mines case stressed the fact that

the third party had not attempted to repudiate. In a modern comment on the English
view it was said, "It is interesting to note that although forty years have elapsed.

..

the

decision in Bolton v. Lambert has yet to be expressly overruled either by the House of
Lords or the Privy Council, or in any of the appellate courts of CaLnada." Tamaki, The
Rule in Bolton v. Lambert, 19 CAN. B. REV. 733 (1941).
3. Bolton Partners v. Lambert, 41 Ch. D. 295, 309 (C. A. 1887). The court stated:
"[T]here was a contract made by Scratchiey assuming to act for the Plaintiffs, subject
to proof by the Plaintiffs that Scratchley had that authority. The Plaintiffs subsequently

did adopt the contract, and thereby recognized the authority of their agent Scratchley.
Directly they did so the doctrine of ratification applied and gave the same effect to the
contract made by Scratchlev, as it would have had if Scratchley had been clothed with a
precedent authority to make it." The court to substantiate its finding and to show the

harshness of this rule referred to Hagedorn v. Oliverson, 2 Mau. & Sel. 485, 105 Eng.
Rep. 461 (K. B. 1814), where the principal was allowed to ratify even after known loss.
But this case is controlled by maritime law and therefore being a recognized exception,

does not furnish an adequate basis for the decision of the Bolton case.

4. Andrews v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 596, 604 (1883) ; see also 1 MEcrEmr,
AGENCY § 517 (2d ed. 1914) ; STORY, AGENCY § 245-248 (5th ed. 1857).
5. Tamaki, The Rule in Bolton v. Lambert, 19 CAN. B. REv. 733, 745 (1941).
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parties could "undo what they had done." 6 The reasoning given for this decision was .that where two parties enter into a contract the same two parties
can mutually agree to dissolve it. This explanation seems inadequate because
the contract that the third party intended to make was with the principal and
not with the agent. This is the very basis for allowing the subsequent ratification of the contract by the*principal and to say that it is now a contract/
between the agent and the third party is to deny the existence of the doctrine
of ratification. Perhaps a hypothetical example will help to clarify this. Suppose
A, without authority, offers to sell T Blackacre, which is owned by P. According to the decision in Bolton v. Lambert, P by ratifying the contract merely
supplies the proof of A's authority.7 T is not allowed to recede at any time.
To allow T to agree with A to recede is inconsistent with the basis of the
decision in Bolton v. Lambert because it would in effect be saying that there
was no relation between P and T prior to ratification. While the resultpermitting the agent and the third party to recede from the transaction-may
be a salutary one, the reasoning given appears anomalous.
This English theory applies the doctrine of ratification without regard to
the injustice it may produce in a particular case. 8 It has been suggested that
"in Bolton Partnersv. Lambert the court laid too much stress upon the maxim,
which at most tells what is the effect of ratification when it is conceded that
ratification does have some effect, and too little stress upon the rules indicating when ratification is, and when it is not, admissible. When the result of
permitting ratification is ... to allow the unbound principal time to profit by
developments in the market, while the adverse party is bound ab initio and
has no power to withdraw from the unexpectedly unequal transaction, the
result is so unjust as to make this an unfit place for applying the doctrine
of relation." 9
AMERICAN VIEW

In the United States the prevailing doctrine is that the third party may
recede from the contract prior to ratification by the principal. 10 The explanations advanced, however, are somewhat at variance. ,
The view supported by the greater number of states is that the third party
6. Walter v. James, L. R. 6 Ex. 124, 127 (1871).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. "The English Cases . . . must be wrong. To say that to allow the third person
to withdraw before P has had a reasonable opportunity to ratify is to 'deprive the doctrine
of its retroactive effect' and cause it not to be 'equipollent to a prior command' is to
worship the fiction of relation back as a transcendental shrine and justifies the harshest
language used by critics of the doctrine." Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.
J. 859, 891 (1920).
9. Wambaugh, A Problem as to Ratification, 9 HARv. L. REv. 60, 68 (1895). An
extensive treatment of this problem is presented here.
10. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U. S. 461, 21 Sup. Ct. 845, 45 L. Ed. 1183 (1901) ; Moore
v. Petty, 135 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 8th 1905) ; Townsend v. Corning, 23 Wend. 435 (N. Y.
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can recede prior to ratification because of the lack of mutuality. Since the
principal is not bound by the act of the unauthorized agent the third party
should not be bound if he wishes to withdraw. However, as soon as the principal does ratify the unauthorized transaction the mutuality which'was lacking
is then present. The principal cannot then withdraw his ratification nor can
the third party effectively recede. The parties are bound to the terms of the
entire agreement as if they had been the original contracting parties.
It is apparent from this explanation that the third party is treated as
having entered into a contract with the unauthorized agent. This transaction
has been considered as an act in the nature of an offer which differs from an
ordinary offer in that it does not expire of its own accord within a reasonable
time, as an ordinary offer would.'" Others have selected the term "conditional
contract" as a name for this transaction.' 2 These are both unfortunate misnomers. The first is contrary to the intent of the parties since more than an
offer was intended and more than an offer resulted. The latter is guilty of the
same defect. The parties neither expressed nor intended a condition to be
embodied in their contract. An analogous situation will clarify this misconceived 'approach. Suppose in a two-party situation A offers to sell Blackacre
to B and B accepts this offer. Will the fact that A did not own Blackacre
make this transaction entered into by the parties less than a contract? B
cannot have specific performance of the contract but this is not a right
assured to every contracting party. 13 B is entitled to damages resulting from
this disappointment. If this is a "conditional contract" or "in the nature of an
offer" then it would seem that B would have no cause of action on thd contract. The parties bargained for the sale of Blackacre and to construe their
acts otherwise would be to make a different contract for them. Is there any
reason to say that an unauthorized agent and a third, party in a given sithiation
did not enter into a contract? Offer, acceptance and consideration are present.
The mere fact that the agent was unauthorized to enter the contract should not
affect the terminology as to the transaction nor as to the relationship of the
parties to any greater extent than shown in the example above. If this transaction is treated as a contract and if it is recognized that the third party has no
rights against the principal until the latter assents to be bound according to
the agreement, the necessity of misinterpreting the intent of the parties will
be avoided. The third party retains his right against the unauthorized agent
1840) ; Athe v. Bartholemew, 69 Wis. 43, 33 N. W. 110 (1887) ; HUFFCUT, AGEN Y § 38
(2d ed. 1901); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 88 (1933) ("To constitute ratification, the
affirmance of a transaction must be before the third person has manifested his withdrawal
from it either to the purported principal or to the agent, and before the offer or agreement
has otherwise terminated or been discharged") ; Note, 5 Am. St. Rep. 109, 112 (1889).
11. Wambaugh, supra note 9, at 67.

12. Ibid.
13. 5 WILtISTON,

CONRACrS §

1425 (Rev. ed. 1937).
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and he is in no worse position than B was in the example given above where
14
there were only two parties involved.
In discussing this problem it may be helpful to point out that a person
dealing with an agent has the duty of using reasonable diligence and prudence
to ascertain the extent of the ageit's authority.15 He has the burden of ascertaining the extent of the agent's authority in his dealings with him. If the
third party in a given situation neglects to do this and is thereby injured, he has
a cause of action against the agent on the agent's implied warranty of his
authority, but no rights against the supposed principal. 16 If the principal in
the meantime ratifies the transaction prior to the third party's discovery of
this lack of authority then the third party has suffered no greater detriment
than if the agent bad authority in the first instance. The third party receives
exactly what he bargaified for and should not now be heard to complain of this
7
lack of authority.'
The American rule recognizes the relationship of the parties and allows
ratification when it will cause no greater disadvantage to either party than
would have occurred if the act were originally authorized. On the other hand
this rule decreases the harshness of the English position by permitting the
third party to withdraw from the agreement prior to ratification upon discovery of the lack of authority. A withdrawal by the third party prior to ratification will not in any respect injure the unsuspecting principal and will prevent
the disadvantage which might result to the third party if he were refused this
right to withdraw.
14. "This is exactly what the doctrine of ratification does. T gets what he expected,
neither more nor less. He did not expect or desire a claim against A and he has no
reason to be disappointed if it is taken away. He did expect and desire a contract with P
and that is what he receives, including the date and place to which he assented. But it is
argued, P receives a godsend. In a changing market he has the choice of accepting or
rejecting the contract. This does no harm, however, unless the third person is in some
way injured. If the principal does not assent, he has not injured the third person; there
is no ratification and no anomaly. The third person may sue the one who has caused the
loss, viz., A. If he does ratify, the fact that he was not bound in the meantime cannot
be of importance since it has not influenced T. The latter with his lack of knowledge is
-entitled to no sympathy. It is a human trait to shiver at perils which have passed us by
in our sleep, but such were only potential and not actual injuries." Seavey, The Rationale
.of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 888 (1920).
15. This general principle was clearly stated in Brutinel v. Nygren, 17 Ariz. 491, 154
Pac. 1042, 1045 (1916), where the court said: "The mere fact that one is dealing with
an agent, whether the agency be general or special, should be a danger signal, and like
a railroad crossing suggests the duty to 'stop, look and listen,' and if he would .bind the
"principal is bound to ascertain, not only the fact of agency, but the nature and extent
-of the authority, and in case either is controverted the burden of proof is upon him to
,establish it." See also, 1 MECHEm, AGENCY §§ 743-750 (2d ed. 1914).
16. At one time it was thought that the agent's liability was on the contract, but
-today the generally accepted view is that the agent's liability is predicated on the breach
,of his implied warranty of authority. Clements v. Citizens Bank of Booneville, 177 Ark.
1085, 9 S. W. 2d 569 (1928) ; Murray Oil Products Co. v. Poons Co., 190 Misc. 110,
74 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (N. Y. City Ct. 1947); Brawley v. Anderson, 80 Ohio App. 15, 74
2q. E. 2d 428 (1947) ; Memphis Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Hanson, 4 Tenn. App. 293
<1926). Notes, 42 A. L. R. 1310 (1926); 60 A. L. R. 1348 (1929); 64 A. L. R. 1194
(1929) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 338 (1933).
17. See note 14 supra.

NOTES
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WISCONSIN RULE

18

In Dodge v. HopkiZs the Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced a
rule which has in essence refuted the doctrine of ratification. Dodge and his
wife executed a letter of attorney giving Coolbaugh authority to sell certain
land purportedly held jointly by them. Coolbaugh entered into a contract with
Hopkins to convey specific realty for a sum certain. Dodge, who was the sole
owner of the property, attempted to ratify this unauthorized act. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed the judgment of the lower court which allowed
Dodge recovery on the contract, and stated that the "principal in such case
may, by his subsequent assent, bind himself, but if the contract be executory,
he cannot bind the other party. The latter may, if he choose, avail himself
of such assent against the principal, which, if he does, the contract, by virtue
of such inutual ratification, becomes nuatually obligatory." 19 In speaking of
"mutual ratification," the court is really saying that the original transaction
was a nullity, since a new offer and acceptance are required, and thereby destroying the doctrine of ratification.
Judge Dixon in his opinion was disturbed by the "dicta and observations
to be found in the books," 20 which state the doctrine of ratification as applied
to similar cases by other courts. He attempts to evolve a distinction between
cases in which the principal seeks to use ratification as the basis for an action
against the third party and those in which the third party attempts to base a
demand against the principal upon this ratification. The conclusion reached
was that this case *falls in the former category and therefore the ratification
is unavailing unless the third party also assents to be bound. This attempted
distinction is subject to the same criticism as the Wisconsin rule itself because
to say that ratification applies in those cases in which the third party seeks to
benefit by the ratification is just another way of requiring assent by the
third party.
This view expressed by the Wisconsin court is in keeping with the
21
American view that the third party may recede prior to ratification. But it
extends the requisites of ratification to an extent which has not been folstand and refused to relowed by other courts. Wisconsin has taken this
22
years.
odd
eighty
for
consider its original position
18. 14 Wis. 686 (1861) ; HuFFcuT, AGENCY § 38 (2d ed. 1901) ; 1 MECHEM, AGENCY
§ 515 (2d ed. 1914) ; Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L. J. 859, 891 (1920) ;
Wambaugh, A Problen as to Ratification, 9 HARv. L. REv. 60, 64 (1895); Note, [1947]
Wis. L. REv. 394.
19. Dodge v. Hopkins, 14 Wis. 686, 695 (1861).
20. Id. at 694.
21. See note 10 supra.
22. [1947] Wis. L. REv. 394. Louisiana has a statute which adopts the American
view [LA. CIVIL CODE ANN., art. 1840 (1945)], but courts of that state have ignored the
statute and at various times have approved the American view, the Wisconsin view and
the view expressed by the Restatement of Agency. Note, 5 LA. L. REV. 308, 310 (1943).
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This rule has suffered extensive criticism 23 and it has been suggested
that "when the courts of Wisconsin are again faced with the problem of the
effect of ratification on the rights and liabilities of third parties, they adopt
the view announced in the Restatement of Agency." 24
The Restatement of Agency states a rule which combines the doctrine of
ratification as followed by the American courts with an equitable exception
designed to prevent unjust results. If the "situation has so materially changed
that it would be. inequitable to subject him [the third party] to liability
25
thereon" affirmance will not be effective as ratification.
RATIFICATION OF INSURANCE AFTER FIRE-Loss

The American courts have recognized the right of the principal to
ratify a contract of insurance entered into by an unauthorized agent with
the third party (insurer) even after loss by fire. 26 But ratification must come
before actual withdrawal by the third party. 27 The courts and commentators,
although arriving at the identical result, have resorted to sociological and
commercial arguments to justify the right of ratification in insurance fire-loss
cases. This is a needless retreat because the problem is the same whether the
contract be of insurance or for the sale of property. In the latter situation
American courts permit ratification even though the third party has made
what results in a disadvantageous agreement. The third party gets exactly
what he bargained for in one situation as well as in the other. In both, the
principal can reap what he has not sown.
The English view appears to be that the principal 'cannot ratify after
fire-loss in an insurance transaction.28 This is contrary to the result reached
in Boltou v. Lambert,29 where, it will be recalled, ratification was permitted
even though prior to this the third party had attempted to withdraw. A pos23. Hurcur, AGENCY § 38 (2d ed. 1901); 1 MECHIEM, AGENCY § 515 (2d ed.
1914); TIFFANY, AGENCY § 62 (2d ed., Powell, 1924); Wambaugh, A Problem as to

Ratification, 9 HARV. L. REV. 60, 64 (1895) ; [1947] Wis. L. REv. 394, 395. Mr. Mechem
states that he believes the Wisconsin rule sound. Mechem, The Effect of Ratification as
Between the Principaland the Other Party, 4 MIcir. L. REv. 269, 279 (1905).
24. [1947] Wis. L. REv. 394, 395.
25. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 89 (1933).
26. Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 198 Fed. 475 (C. C. A. 2d 1912)
cert. denied, 229 U. S. 621 (1913). This rule was recently affirmed in Equity Mutual
Insurance Co. v. General Casualty Co. of America, 139 F. 2d 723 (C. C. A. 10th 1944).
This same rule was relied upon to allow a customer of a laundry to ratify a bailee'scustomer policy procured by the laundry to insure against loss or damage of the
customer's goods. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet Wash Laundry Co.,
168 F. 2d 381, 384 (C. C. A. 10th 1948). For an extensive treatment, see Robinson,
Ratification After Loss in Fire Insurance, 18 CORN. L. Q. 161 (1933).
27. The court in the Marqnsee case ordered a new trial in order to give the plaintiff
(principal) an opportunity to show that he ratified the contract before the defendant
withdrew. Marqusee v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 198 Fed. 475, 478 (C. C. A. 2d

1912).
28. Grover & Grover Ltd. v. Mathews, [1910] 2 K. B. 401, discussed in Robinson,
Ratification After Loss in Fire Insurancc, 18 CORN. L. Q. 161, 165 (1933).
29. -See note 2 supra.
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sible explanation for this position may be that the court was under the impression that to extend the principal's right to ratification to an insurance
situation where the property was destroyed by fire would be an unwarranted
extension of an exception which hafd existed only as to marine insurance.
But the court failed to recognize that the basic problem was identical to that
in the Bolton case. There thus exists in England an anomalous situation; although the third party cannot withdraw under the Bolton rule, the same result
is accomplished in fire-loss cases by denying the principal the right to ratify.
The Restatement of Agency adopts the English view in saying that
ratification must come before such a material change in conditions that it
would be inequitable to subject the third party to liability thereon.30
CONCLUSION

This survey of the contrasting theories demonstrates the limitations of
words used by various courts and writers. Any attempt to resolve the problems
of ratification by a superficial resort to the terrfiinology of the law of agency
or contracts is futile. An analysis of the transaction with the rights and corresponding liabilities of the parties is the only sound approach to the solution
of this problem. At the time the assumed agent and the third party enter
their agreement there is consideration for the third party's promise; the
agent's warranty is sufficient consideration. 3 ' The third party at this point
can rescind the contract because of mutual mistake, if the agent unknowingly
exceeded his authority,32 or because of a unilateral mistake, if the agent knew
he had no authority.33 However, if the third party fails to rescind the contract before the assumed principal ratifies then the third party should no longer be permitted to do so. The third party is receiving exactly what he bargained for and can not complain that he was bound while the principal was
not.3 4 Ratification is the juristic act which binds the rights and liabilities of
the parties. Once the principal does ratify, the rights and liabilities of all
three parties are altered. The principal is bound for the first time and he can
not now withdraw his ratification.3 5 The third party has lost his right to rescind
because of the agent's lack of authority.36 The agent is released from liability
30. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 89 (1933).

31. No new consideration is needed for ratification. 1 MECHEM, AGENCY § 351
(2d ed. 1914).
32. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1518, 1544, 1558 (Rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY §§ 259, 260, 263 (1933); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 477(b) (1932) ; RE-

STATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 28(c) (1937).
33. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1578 (Rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 503 (1932) :36 YALE L. 3. 1183 (1927).
34. See Note 14 supra.
35. See note 1 supra for a discussion of the requisites which must be satisfied in
order for ratification to bind the principal. Once the principal has effectively ratified
he can not withdraw. Stark v. Starr, 94 U. S. 477, 24 L. Ed. 276 (1876); HUFFCT,
AGENCY § 45 (2d ed. 1901) ; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 102 (1933).
36. See note 10 spra. This is the prevailing American view, which states that the
third party may withdraw at any time before ratification by the principal.

108

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 2

on his implied warranty of authority as the ratification has cured this defect.81
If this analysis is kept in mind, courts which recognize the doctrine would
have less difficulty explaining their decisions and would eventually eliminate
the confusion which is present in this field.
THEODORE

G. PAPPAS

37. See note 16 supra. "An agent after ratification of his unauthorized act by his
principal is in the same relation to the third party as if the acts had been previously
authorized. The principal alone is generally liable on a contract which he has ratified,
though if the third party is free to accept or reject the ratification [as he is under the
Wisconsin rule] and chooses to reject, the agent would be liable on his warranty of
authority." HuFFcuT, AGENCY § 49 (2d ed. 1901).

